党的十二大至十八大一直强调经济增长速度，党的十九大将经济增长目标转向经济发展质量。基于此，本文尝试考察经济增长速度目标与发展质量目标的权衡。在理论上，本文证明当政府的政策工具是要素投入时，经济增长目标与经济发展质量负相关，经济增长目标侵蚀经济发展质量；当政策工具是技术进步时，二者正相关，可以同时提高。在经验分析上，本文采用2000-2012年的省区增长速度目标数据发现，经济增长目标每提高1个百分点，发展质量将下降约1个百分点。这些发现支持当政策工具是要素投入时增长目标"侵蚀"发展质量的理论预测，亦揭示了中央政府降低经济增长目标，地方政府将政策工具转向创新驱动发展，能够实现经济高质量和可持续发展，终结中国经济崩溃论。

Since the 12th National Congress, the Communist Party of China has been emphasizing the economic growth rate. However, it was not until the 19th CPC National Congress that this target shifted towards the high quality development. Based on this fact, we attempt to explore the mechanism behind the choice of growth target. Theoretically, we show that in an economy in which factor inputs drive economic growth, the growth rate is negatively related to the quality of economic development, whereas if technological progress drives economic growth, the growth rate and the quality of economic development are positively linked and can be improved simultaneously. Empirically, using data on the economic growth targets from the provincial level government reports from 2000 to 2012, we find that the elasticity of the economic growth target with respect to the quality of economic development is about -1. This empirical finding supports the theoretical prediction that growth targets "erode" the quality of development when policy instruments are factor inputs only. It also reveals that if the central government reduces the economic growth target and local governments transform their policy tools towards innovation-driven development strategy correspondingly, the Chinese economy is able to achieve high quality and sustainable development, thus putting an end to the economic collapse theory.