进入管制、腐败与反腐败政策

世界经济 ›› 2017, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (8): 103-119.

进入管制、腐败与反腐败政策

聂辉华, 李琛

中国人民大学经济学院北京市海淀区中关村大街59号 100872

出版日期:2017-08-10 发布日期:2017-09-12
作者简介:聂辉华,E-mail:niehuihua@vip.163.com;李琛,中国人民大学经济学院
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金委面上项目（71572190）、教育部青年长江学者项目的资助、中国人民大学科学研究基金项目（17XNH036）的资助。

Entry Regulation, Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policy

Nie Huihua, Li Chen

Online:2017-08-10 Published:2017-09-12

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文通过构建一个行业进入管制的混合寡头模型，研究政府在不同制度环境下的最优反腐败政策。我们发现：（1）当腐败成本很低且政府对就业重视程度较小时，政府最优政策是治标（打击腐败但保留进入管制）；（2）当政府对就业重视程度非常大时，不论腐败成本高低，政府最优政策都是治本（去除管制）；（3）当政府对就业重视程度较大且腐败成本较低，或政府对就业重视程度较小且腐败成本较高时，保持现状是最优选择；（4）治标政策导致社会总产量最低、价格最高，治本政策导致社会总产量最高、价格最低，保持现状政策的结果处于两者之间。本文结论对于当前反腐败政策和简政放权改革具有重要的理论启示。

关键词: 腐败, 进入管制, 反腐败, 混合寡头

Abstract: This paper builds a mixed oligopoly model to explain government's optimal anti-corruption policy under different institutional environment.We find that:(1)If the corruption cost is low enough and government does not pay much attention to the employment, "treating symptoms"(retaining regulation but fighting against corruption)is the optimal anti-corruption policy.(2)When government attaches great importance to the employment, no matter what corruption cost is, "treating the root"(removing industry regulation to eradicate corruption)is the optimal anti-corruption policy.(3)When government pays attention to the employment and corruption cost is relatively low, or when government does not pay much attention to the employment and corruption cost is relatively high, "keeping status quo"(allowing the existing of regulation and bribery)is the optimal choice.(4)"treating symptoms"leads to the lowest total social output and the highest price;"treating the root"leads to the opposite result; "keeping status quo"leads to one in between.The conclusions of this paper have important theoretical enlightenments for the current anti-corruption policy.

Key words: corruption, entry regulation, anti-corruption, mixed oligopoly

中图分类号:

聂辉华, 李琛. 进入管制、腐败与反腐败政策[J]. 世界经济, 2017, 0(8): 103-119.

Nie Huihua, Li Chen. Entry Regulation, Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policy[J]. , 2017, 0(8): 103-119.

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