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### 金融监管结构是否影响宏观杠杆率

1. 1. 中国人民大学国家发展与战略研究院 北京市海淀区中关村大街59号 100872;
2. 中国人民大学经济学院;
3. 中国人民银行办公厅
• 出版日期:2019-03-10 发布日期:2019-03-25
• 作者简介:刘晓光:电子信箱:lxg2015@ruc.edu.cn;刘元春:电子信箱:rmulyc@vip.sina.com;王健:电子信箱:wjian1@pbc.gov.cn
• 基金资助:
中国人民大学科学研究基金（中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助）"杠杆率的形成与作用机制及其治理方案研究"的项目成果（19XNI008）。

### Does the Structure of Financial Regulation Affect Leverage?

Liu Xiaoguang1, Liu Yuanchun2, Wang Jian3

• Online:2019-03-10 Published:2019-03-25

Abstract: Since the global financial crisis, how to improve the effectiveness of financial supervision and promote economic deleveraging has become an important theoretical and practical issue. However, there are few in-depth studies concerning the impact of the financial regulatory structure on leverage. From the regulatory authority and supervisory model perspectives, this paper examines the influence of the financial supervision structure on the leverage ratio. Based on theoretical analysis of the underlying mechanism, the paper performs an empirical analysis using panel data of 67 economies. The paper shows that financial regulatory authority has a significant impact on the leverage ratio, and that the central bank is more effective at deleveraging when it assumes banking sector supervision, with its effect positively related to its level of independence. While the direct impact of supervisory model is not significant, it has an interaction effect with the regulatory authority. In the case that the regulatory authority is independent of the central bank, mixed supervision is more effective than separate supervision. Meanwhile, the regulatory effect is heterogeneous. In developing countries, the central bank mixed supervision structure is the most effective.