世界经济 ›› 2019, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (1): 170-192.

• • 上一篇    

中国上市公司“小股民行动”现象的影响因素与经济后果

郑志刚1,2, 石丽娜1,2, 黄继承1, 郭杰3   

  1. 1. 中国人民大学财政金融学院 北京市海淀区中关村大街59号 100872;
    2. 中国财政金融政策研究中心;
    3. 英国杜伦大学
  • 出版日期:2019-01-10 发布日期:2019-01-26
  • 通讯作者: 石丽娜,电子信箱:shilina333666@163.com E-mail:shilina333666@163.com
  • 作者简介:郑志刚,电子信箱:zhengzhigang@ruc.edu.cn;黄继承,电子信箱:hjc@ruc.edu.cn;郭杰,电子信箱:jie.guo@durham.ac.uk。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然基金面上项目(71472177)和青年项目(71402182)的资助。

Influential Factors and Economic Consequences of Minority Shareholders' Decisions: Evidence from Listed Companies in China

Zheng Zhigang1,2, Shi Lina1,2, Huang Jicheng1, Guo Jie3   

  • Online:2019-01-10 Published:2019-01-26

摘要: 本文利用近年来中小股东提出不同于控股股东的新议案和否决其旧议案的"小股民行动"事件,考察了中国上市公司中小股东如何主动参与上市公司治理的问题。研究发现,当中小股东相对力量较大、缺乏可依靠且独立性较高的董事会时,中小股东发起提案的可能性将增加;而中小股东否决旧议案主要受公司绩效的影响。小股民行动通过促使董事会成员变更改善公司治理结构,最终提高公司长期绩效。上述实现路径在非国有企业、股权结构较分散、制衡度较高的企业中更加显著。因而,小股民行动成为中国资本市场进入股权分散时代潜在的外部治理机制之一。

关键词: 小股民行动, 股权分散, 提案, 否决, 董事会成员更迭

Abstract: This paper empirically examines the influential factors and the economic consequences of "minority shareholders' decisions" on listed companies in China, taking advantage of the phenomenon of recent years whereby these decisions have materialised from the proposal of new motions different from those of the controlling shareholders and the vetoing of their old proposed motions. The study shows that minority shareholders submit proposals with greater ease in companies whose ownership structures are relatively decentralised-they have relatively greater power when balancing controlling shareholder decisions. At the same time, it is noted that the lack of a board of directors with a high level of independence to be relied upon is also an incentive for such decisions being carried out. On the other hand, corporate performance has a significant impact on minority shareholders when it comes to vetoing the old motions. We also find that "minority shareholders' decisions" improve the corporate governance structure by promoting change implementation among the members of the board of directors, and ultimately enhance the company's long-term performance, although this leads to a short-term negative market response. This mechanism is more obvious and efficient in non-state-owned enterprises or companies where the ownership structure is more dispersed-the checks and balances are higher. "Minority shareholders' decisions", therefore, are one of the potential corporate governance mechanisms in the Chinese capital market when accessing the diffuse ownership era.

Key words: minority shareholders' decisions, diffuse ownership, proposal submission, veto, board member turnover

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