世界经济 ›› 2018, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (3): 147-169.

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地方保护与经济增长的囚徒困境

张宇   

  1. 南开大学经济学院国际经济研究所 跨国公司研究中心 天津市南开区卫津路94号经济学院12层 300071
  • 出版日期:2018-03-10 发布日期:2018-03-24
  • 作者简介:张宇,电子信箱,zhangyu_nk@126.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家社科基金重大项目(15ZDA057)和南开大学中央基本科研业务费专项基金(63172012)的资助

Local Protection and the Prisoner's Dilemma of Economic Growth

Zhang Yu   

  • Online:2018-03-10 Published:2018-03-24

摘要: 本文在控制运输成本变化的情况下重新测度了中国的地方保护程度,利用基于空间自回归的联立模型对地方保护行为的动机及经济增长效果进行了检验。结果表明,作为一种占优战略,地方政府单方面的保护行为会促进本地经济增长,但在考虑地区间的互动联系后,单一地区的保护行为会因触发其他地区的效仿而使经济增长整体陷入"囚徒困境"。地方政府对经济增长的追求不仅是引发地方保护行为的重要制度诱因,而且是激化地方政府之间竞争,引发经济增长绩效整体下滑的关键。

关键词: 分权, 地方保护, 市场分割, 经济增长, 空间自回归

Abstract: We recalculated the degree of Chinese local protection by controlling the change of transportation cost, analyzed the motivation as well as the growth effect when taking account of the character of Chinese decentralization and the interaction among regions and using the simultaneous equations model based on Spatial Auto-Regression (SAR). The study shows, as a dominant strategy, one local government's unilateral protective actions may promote its GDP to some extent, but concerning about the interaction of different regions, it will touch off the emulation of other regions and pull all of them into the "prisoner's dilemma" of growth. The local government's pursuit of the economic growth is not only the important incentives to initiate the local protection, but also the key reasons that simulate competition among regions and reduce the growth performance of the whole economy.

Key words: decentralization, local protection, market segmentation, economic growth, spatial auto-regression

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